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Abstract: The spatiotemporal patterns of spread of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses on a country-
wide scale are unclear in many tropical/subtropical regions mainly because spatiotemporally rep-
resentative sequence data are lacking. We isolated, sequenced, and analyzed 383 A(H1N1)pdm09 
viral genomes from hospitalized patients between 2009 and 2018 from seven locations across Kenya. 
Using these genomes and contemporaneously sampled global sequences, we characterized the 
spread of the virus in Kenya over several seasons using phylodynamic methods. The transmission 
dynamics of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Kenya were characterized by (i) multiple virus introductions 
into Kenya over the study period, although only a few of those introductions instigated local sea-
sonal epidemics that then established local transmission clusters, (ii) persistence of transmission 
clusters over several epidemic seasons across the country, (iii) seasonal fluctuations in effective re-
production number (Re) associated with lower number of infections and seasonal fluctuations in 
relative genetic diversity after an initial rapid increase during the early pandemic phase, which 
broadly corresponded to epidemic peaks in the northern and southern hemispheres, (iv) high virus 
genetic diversity with greater frequency of seasonal fluctuations in 2009–2011 and 2018 and low 
virus genetic diversity with relatively weaker seasonal fluctuations in 2012–2017, and (v) virus 
spread across Kenya. Considerable influenza virus diversity circulated within Kenya, including 
persistent viral lineages that were unique to the country, which may have been capable of dissemi-
nation to other continents through a globally migrating virus population. Further knowledge of the 
viral lineages that circulate within understudied low-to-middle-income tropical and subtropical re-
gions is required to understand the full diversity and global ecology of influenza viruses in humans 
and to inform vaccination strategies within these regions. 
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The novel influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus strain emerged in North America during 
March–April 2009, spread rapidly among humans, and developed into the first human 
pandemic of the 21st century [1–4]. By July 2009, 168 countries reported a total of 162,300 
laboratory-confirmed cases and over 1100 human deaths [5–7]. Subsequently, it was esti-
mated that globally over 123,000 deaths from March to December 2009 were associated 
with A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection [8]. The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus displaced the seasonal 
A(H1N1) virus and has continued to circulate as a seasonal virus in subsequent years, 
causing annual seasonal epidemics alongside influenza A(H3N2) and B viruses globally 
[9–12], including in Kenya [13–17]. 
The global surveillance of influenza viruses has resulted in the generation of an ex-
tensive collection of geographically and temporally comprehensive virus sequence data, 
which has provided an opportunity to explore the drivers of global spread of influenza 
viruses [18–22]. For instance, genomic analysis found that multiple independent introduc-
tions of genetically distinct A(H1N1)pdm09 virus lineages occurred in most countries; in 
the United Kingdom, only two of the many lineages that were introduced at the start of 
the pandemic were detected there 6 months later [9,23]. Elsewhere, a pair of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission chains appeared to have persisted in west Africa for 
almost 2 years [24]. Since the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus became endemic, such spatiotemporal 
patterns of spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses on a countrywide scale have, however, not 
been determined in many tropical/subtropical regions where virus circulation patterns do 
not show a clear seasonality as they do in temperate countries [25,26]. This is often due to 
insufficient spatiotemporally representative sequence data [27,28]. A more complete un-
derstanding of the regional and the global spread of influenza viruses, however, requires 
deeper and wider sampling from understudied tropical/subtropical regions [28]. 
Surveillance of influenza viruses is ongoing in several parts of Kenya [13,17,29,30]. 
These are carried out by the Kenya Medical Research Institute (KEMRI), Ministry of 
Health, Kenya, KEMRI—Wellcome Trust Research Program (KWTRP), and the USA 
Army Medical Research Directorate (USAMRD-K). In 2007, the Ministry of Health, Kenya 
with technical support from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) Kenya country office 
(CDC-Kenya) established a National Influenza Surveillance System in response to the 
2005 influenza A(H5N1) virus threat. The aims of the surveillance system were to identify 
circulating strains of influenza virus, describe the epidemiology and burden of influenza 
in Kenya, and serve as a component of an early warning system for pandemic influenza 
[13]. CDC-Kenya conducts surveillance for influenza and influenza-like illness (ILI) and 
severe acute respiratory illness (SARI) throughout the country; these are conducted in 
sentinel hospitals, health facilities at demographic surveillance sites, and refugee camps, 
which represent varied urban, rural, high mobility, and socioeconomic conditions [13]. 
The KWTRP Virus Epidemiology and Control (VEC) team established research collabora-
tion with CDC-Kenya through a joint study and a countrywide pathway of transmission 
study entitled “Studies of the pathways of transmission of respiratory virus disease” 
(SPReD-Kenya)—http://virec-group.org/spred-kenya/ (accessed on 10 September 2021), 
which also provided samples for this study. 
Influenza surveillance activities in Kenya reported at least four separate introduc-
tions of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus into the country during the pandemic in 2009, with the first 
laboratory-confirmed case reported on 29 June 2009 [31,32]. In an effort to fill the gap in 
studies that seek to describe the transmission of influenza viruses in tropical settings, we 
studied the Kenya-wide patterns of introduction and spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus 
since it was introduced into the local population in 2009. We isolated, sequenced, and 
analyzed 383 A(H1N1)pdm09 virus codon-complete genome sequences sampled between 
2009 and 2018 from seven locations in Kenya alongside contemporaneously sampled 
global sequences, to investigate the introduction and spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses to 
Kenya.  
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2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Sample Sources and Molecular Screening 
Samples analyzed in this study were collected through two health facility-based sur-
veillance networks. The first involved continuous countrywide surveillance for influenza 
through SARI sentinel hospital reporting. This was undertaken at six sites supported by 
CDC-Kenya: Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH), Nakuru County and Referral Hospital 
(CRH), Nyeri CRH, Kakamega CRH, Siaya CRH, and Coast General Teaching and Refer-
ral Hospital (Figure S1) [13,14,16,33]. The second was the pediatric viral pneumonia sur-
veillance undertaken at the Kilifi County Hospital (KCH) (Figure S1) [29]. 
In the CDC-supported surveillance sites, a total of 41,685 nasopharyngeal/oropha-
ryngeal (NP/OP) swab samples were collected from SARI inpatient admissions of all ages 
from June 2009 through December 2018. Samples were stored in viral transport medium 
(VTM) at −80 °C prior to processing [13]. Of these, 41,102 swabs were tested for influenza 
A virus (IAV), with positive samples subsequently subtyped for A(H1N1)pdm09 and 
A(H3N2) viruses using real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-
PCR) [13,14,16]. A total of 1307 (3.2%) A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-positive samples were ob-
tained. Of these, 418 (31.9%) A(H1N1)pdm09 virus=positive samples were selected for this 
analysis on the basis of an RT-PCR cycle threshold (Ct) of <35.0 (as a proxy for high viral 
load), an adequate sample volume for RNA extraction (>140 μL), and a balanced distribu-
tion of samples based on surveillance sites and years. 
In the second facility-based surveillance undertaken at KCH from January 2009 
through December 2018, a total of 6147 NP/OP swab samples were collected and tested 
from children <5 years admitted with syndromic severe or very severe pneumonia [15,29]. 
Samples were stored in VTM at −80 °C prior to molecular screening. Samples were 
screened for a range of respiratory viruses, including IAV, using a multiplex real-time 
reverse transcription (RT)-PCR assay employing Qiagen QuantiFast RT-PCR kit (Qiagen, 
Hilden, Germany) [34]. An (RT)-PCR Ct of <35.0 was used to define virus-positive samples 
[34]. A total of 157 (2.6%) IAV-positive specimens were identified from KCH; however, 
these were not subsequently subtyped for A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2) viruses [29]. 
Therefore, all IAV-positive specimens were utilized, and only the A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses 
were selected for the current analysis. 
2.2. RNA Extraction and Multi-Segment Real-Time PCR (M-RTPCR) for IAV 
Viral RNA extraction and M-RTPCR were conducted as previously described [35]. 
Briefly, viral nucleic acid extraction from IAV and A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-positive samples 
was performed using the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany). Ribo-
nucleic acid (RNA) was reverse-transcribed, and the complete coding region of IAV ge-
nome was amplified in a single M-RTPCR using the Uni/Inf primer set [36] in 25 μL PCR 
reactions. Successful amplification was evaluated by running the products on 2% agarose 
gel and visualized on a UV transilluminator after staining with RedSafe Nucleic Acid 
Staining solution (iNtRON Biotechnology Inc., Seoul, South Korea). 
2.3. IAV Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS) and Virus Genome Assembly 
Following PCR, amplicons were purified, quantitated, and normalized to 0.2 ng/μL 
as previously described [35]. Briefly, following PCR, the amplicons were purified with 1× 
AMPure XP Beads (Beckman Coulter Inc., Brea, CA, USA), quantified with Quant-iT 
dsDNA High Sensitivity Assay (Invitrogen, Carlsbard, CA, USA), and normalized to 0.2 
ng/μL. Indexed paired end libraries were generated from 2.5 μL of 0.2 ng/μL amplicon 
pool using a Nextera XT Sample Preparation Kit (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA) follow-
ing the manufacturer’s protocol. Amplified libraries were purified using 0.8× AMPure XP 
beads, quantitated using Quant-iT dsDNA High Sensitivity Assay (Invitrogen, Carlsbard, 
CA, USA), and evaluated for fragment size in the Agilent 2100 BioAnalyzer System using 
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the Agilent High Sensitivity DNA Kit (Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA, USA). Am-
plicon libraries were then diluted to 2 nM in preparation for pooling and denaturation for 
running on the Illumina MiSeq (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA). Pooled libraries were 
denatured with sodium hydroxide, diluted to 12.5 pM, and sequenced on the Illumina 
MiSeq using 2 × 250 base pair (bp) paired-end reads with MiSeq v2 500 Cycle Kit (Illumina, 
San Diego, CA, USA). A 5% Phi-X (Illumina, San Diego, CA, USA) spike-in was added to 
the libraries to increase library diversity by creating a more diverse set of library clusters. 
Contiguous nucleotide sequence assembly from the sequence data was carried out using 
the FLU module of the Iterative Refinement Meta-Assembler (IRMA) [37] using IRMA 
default settings: median read Q-score filter of 30; minimum read length of 125; frequency 
threshold for insertion and deletion refinement of 0.25 and 0.6, respectively; Smith–Wa-
terman mismatch penalty of 5; gap opening penalty of 10. All generated sequence data 
were deposited in the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) EpiFluTM 
database (https://platform.gisaid.org/epi3/cfrontend; accessed on 10 March 2021) using 
accession numbers listed in the metadata file in the report’s GitHub repository 
https://github.com/DCollinsOwuor/H1N1pdm09_Kenya_Phylodynamics/tree/main/ 
Data/; accessed on 11 March 2021. 
2.4. Phylogenetic Analysis  
Consensus nucleotide sequences were aligned using MUSCLE 
(https://www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/msa/muscle/; accessed on 11 March 2021) and translated in 
AliView v1.26 [38], and the individual gene segments of Kenyan sequences were concat-
enated into codon-complete genomes using SequenceMatrix v1.7.8 [39]. Phylogenetic 
trees of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus genomes from Kenya and contemporaneously sampled 
global sequences were reconstructed with maximum-likelihood and bootstrap analysis of 
1000 replicates. The best-fit nucleotide substitution models were inferred using IQ-TREE 
v1.6.11 [40,41] and those chosen by the Bayesian Information Criterion for each concate-
nated virus genome implemented. The phylogenetic trees were visualized and annotated 
using Figtree v1.4.4 (http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/; accessed on 12 March 2021) 
and ggtree [42]. The full-length hemagglutinin (HA) codon sequences of all viruses were 
used to characterize A(H1N1)pdm09 virus strains into genetic groups (i.e., clades, sub-
clades, and subgroups) using Phylogenetic Clustering with Linear Integer Programming 
(PhyCLIP) [43] and the European CDC Guidelines (https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/sea-
sonal-influenza/surveillance-and-disease-data/influenza-virus-characterisation; accessed 
on 12 March 2021). Representative reference sequences for genetic clade assignment were 
included.  
2.5. Estimating Population Dynamics of A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Kenya from Local 
Transmission Clusters 
To analyze the introduction and local spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Kenya, we 
first differentiated between “transmission clusters” and “single introductions”. Transmis-
sion clusters were defined as groups of sequences that originated from a single introduc-
tion into Kenya. Ancestral state reconstruction of internal nodes based on Kenyan and 
global sequences was used to infer these transmission clusters using a maximum-likeli-
hood approach in TreeTime [44]. To do so, all the sequences were assigned into two dis-
crete location states: (i) Kenyan—all Kenyan sequences, and (ii) non-Kenyan—all se-
quences from anywhere else from the globe. All sequences that clustered together were 
considered to belong in the same transmission cluster if their common ancestral nodes 
were inferred to be in Kenya, whereas each individual transmission cluster was consid-
ered to be the result of a single introduction into Kenya. Clusters were named to reflect 
their placement within global genetic clades 1–7, for example, KENI-GC7 indicates Kenya 
cluster I viruses within global genetic clade 7. According to the identified transmission 
clusters, we utilized the metadata file and script available at https://github.com/DCol-
linsOwuor/H1N1pdm09_Kenya_Phylodynamics/tree/main/Analysis (accessed on 11 
Viruses 2021, 13, 1956 5 of 16 
 
 
March 2021) to re-estimate the number of introductions in R programming software 
v4.0.2. The transmission clusters were then used to analyze the spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus in Kenya using two phylodynamic approaches. First, the effective reproduction 
number (Re), which is the average number of secondary cases generated by an infection, 
was estimated using a birth–death skyline (BDSKY) analysis [45], where all individual 
transmission clusters are assumed to be independent observations of the same process 
with the same parameters [46]. Second, the relative genetic diversity (effective virus pop-
ulation size over time) was estimated using Gaussian Markov random field (GMRF) coa-
lescent smoothing of the effective population size [47]. 
2.6. Spatial Dynamics of A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Kenya  
We conducted phylogeographic analysis to assess virus spread among three geo-
graphical regions of Kenya: (i) central Kenya—Nairobi, Nakuru, and Nyeri, (ii) western 
Kenya—Siaya and Kakamega, and (iii) coastal Kenya—Mombasa and Kilifi (Figure S1) 
using methods implemented in BEAST v1.10.4 package [48]. The analysis was imple-
mented with an asymmetrical discrete trait approach and applied the Bayesian stochastic 
search variable selection (BSSVS) model [49]. Phylogeographic inferences were visualized 
with the Spatial Phylogenetic Reconstruction of Evolutionary Dynamics using Data-
Driven Documents (SPREAD3) software v0.9.7.1c [50]. To visualize the geographic spread 
of the virus over time, a D3 file was generated using SPREAD3 v0.9.7.1c. A Kenya geo.json 
file was used for visualization, and the resulting log files were used to calculate Bayes 
factor (BF) values for significant dispersal rates between discrete locations. 
3. Results 
3.1. IAV Sequencing and Genome Assembly 
Among the 418 A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-positive samples that were available from the 
CDC-Kenya surveillance system, 414 (99.1%) passed pre-sequencing quality control 
checks and were loaded onto the MiSeq (Figure S2). This yielded 344 (83.1%) codon-com-
plete and 66 (15.9%) partial A(H1N1)pdm09 virus genomes; four of the sequenced ge-
nomes were not successfully assembled due to a low number of IAV sequence reads. For 
this analysis, only the 344 codon-complete A(H1N1)pdm09 virus genome sequences were 
included. Among the 157 IAV-positive specimens available from KCH, 94 (59.9%) that 
passed pre-sequencing quality control checks were loaded onto the MiSeq; the 63 (40.1%) 
specimens that were not sequenced had inadequate sample volumes for RNA extraction 
(<140 μL) and failed pre-sequencing quality control checks (Figure S2). A total of 45 
(47.9%) A(H1N1)pdm09 virus (39 codon-complete and six partial) and 49 (52.1%) 
A(H3N2) virus genomes (46 codon-complete and three partial) were successfully gener-
ated from sequencing. Only the 39 codon-complete A(H1N1)pdm09 virus sequences were 
included in these analyses (Figure S2). 
3.2. Spatiotemporal Distribution of Sequenced Samples 
The A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was detected throughout the study period in Kenya, with 
the number of observed cases fluctuating from year to year (Figure 1A). Different locations 
experienced epidemic peaks in different years. However, there were A(H1N1)pdm09 vi-
rus detections in all sites, except in mid-2010, 2012–2013, and 2016, when there was little 
transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus throughout the different sites (Figure 1A). The pro-
portion of sequenced samples roughly reflected the overall distribution of positives that 
were detected from each site (Figure 1A). All A(H1N1)pdm09 virus genetic groups were 
detected in most sites, with their majority detected in five or six of the seven sites, which 
suggests that these lineages were in circulation in most of the sites in Kenya without geo-
graphical restrictions during the study period (Figure 1B). Phylogenetic analysis showed 
that the sequenced 383 A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses from Kenya comprised seven genetic 
groups: clade 7 (n = 97, 25.3%), clade 6 (n = 132, 34.5%), subclade 6C (n = 10, 2.6%), subclade 
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6B (n = 47, 12.3%), subclade 6B.1 (n = 38, 9.9%), subgroup 6B.1A (n = 57, 14.9%), and sub-
group 6B.1A1 (n = 2, 0.5%) (Figure 2). These detections varied by surveillance year: clade 
7—2009–2012; clade 6—2009–2011; subclade 6C—2013–2014; subclade 6B—2014–2016; 
subgroup 6B.1—2015–2016; subgroup 6B.1A and subgroup 6B.1A1—2018 (Figure 1C). 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Kenya, 2009–2018. (A) Bar plot showing 
number of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-positive samples and sequenced positive samples by month be-
tween July 2009 and November 2018 in Kenya. All collected A(H1N1)pdm09 virus-positive samples 
and sequenced samples are indicated by color (all positive samples in gray—
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the color key. (B) Bubble plot showing the distribution of genetic groups by location in Kenya, 2009–
2018. (C) Distribution of genetic groups by surveillance year in Kenya, 2009–2018. The size of the 
circles in panels (B,C) is proportional to the number of samples, as shown in the counts key for the 
figures. 
 
Figure 2. Maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of 1970 influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus sequences from Kenya and con-
temporaneously sampled global locations collected between 2009 and 2018. This is a time-calibrated phylogeny with time 
shown on the x-axis. Branches are colored on the basis of genetic group membership, as shown in the color key. 
3.3. Patterns of Introduction of A(H1N1)pdm09 Viruses into Kenya and Local Transmission 
Clusters 
We first assessed how the 383 sequences from Kenya compared to 1587 sequences 
sampled from around the world between 2009 and 2018 (Supplementary Materials—Col-
lation of contemporaneous global sequence dataset) by inferring their phylogenies. The 
Kenyan genomes spanned the existing global diversity (Figure 3), which suggests ex-
change (most likely introductions into Kenya) of viruses with other areas around the 
globe. For example, phylogenetic tree trunk viruses predominantly originated from North 
America in 2009, consistent with the origins of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in North America in 
2009, which seeded global viruses in 2009–2010. Subsequently, Asia and Europe appeared 
to be the major source populations in 2010–2013 and 2014–2018, respectively (Figure 3). 
The three geographical regions also represent sources of introduction of A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus into Kenya in 2009, 2010–2013, and 2014–2018. On the basis of a reconstruction of 
geographic ancestry, Kenyan sequences grouped into local transmission clusters within 
the global diversity (Figure 3). We inferred 30 transmission clusters (KENI-GC7 to KEN-
XXX-GC6B.1A) (Figure 3), which suggests that the sampled sequences were the result of 
30 independent introductions from areas outside of Kenya. However, despite the rela-
tively strong clustering of Kenyan sequences into transmission clusters, there were rela-
tively few (8/30) introductions that resulted in local epidemics. To investigate if this num-
ber was a strict lower bound for the introductions, we used random subsets of the 383 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus sequences from Kenya to re-estimate the number of introductions 
(Figure 4). We found that the number of estimated introductions started to flatten slightly 
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with the number of sequences subsampled but still grew. This saturating relationship sug-
gests that the study did not grossly underestimate the full number of A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus variants in this report. Seven of the 30 transmission clusters appeared to have per-
sisted over several epidemic seasons (Table 1), which provides evidence for multiyear 
persistence of individual A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission clusters in a specific locality. 
All seven transmission clusters that persisted between 2009 and 2018 consisted of viruses 
sampled across Kenya, which suggests that A(H1N1)pdm09 virus persistence in the coun-
try was not constrained geographically. 
 
Figure 3. Time-resolved maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree of Kenyan and contemporaneously sampled global se-
quences collected between 2009 and 2018 showing continent of sequence sampling and Kenyan transmission clusters. 
Unique Kenyan clusters are labeled with the prefix KEN, followed by cluster grouping and genetic group; for example, 
KENI-GC7 indicates Kenyan cluster I viruses, which fall within global genetic clade 7. The branches are colored on the 
basis of continent of sampling, as shown in the color key. Additionally, the trunk locations are inferred and colored by 
continent, which is based on geographic ancestry analyses of sampled sequences to indicate influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 
virus origins. 
Table 1. Patterns of persistence of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission clusters in Kenya. 
† Cluster Clade Sequences From Circulation Duration of Spread Locations Detected 
KENI-GC-7 7 49 Europe 




Nyeri; Siaya; Kilifi 
KENVII-GC7 7 6 North America 





KENVIII-GC6 6 39 North America 




kamega; Nyeri; Siaya; 
Kilifi 
KENX-GC6 6 88 North America 




kamega; Nyeri; Siaya; 
Kilifi 
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KENXII-GC6C 6C 8 Europe 
January 2013 to Jan-
uary 2014 
1 year Nakuru; Siaya 
KENXVI-GC6B 6B 34 North America 




kamega; Nyeri; Kilifi 
KENXXIII-
GC6B.1 
6B.1 34 Europe 




kamega; Nyeri; Kilifi 
† Cluster, name of transmission cluster; Clade, genetic group membership; Sequences, number of sequences in cluster; 
From, inferred geographical source of virus introduction; Circulation, duration of circulation of the cluster in Kenya; Lo-
cations Detected, Kenyan locations where clusters were detected. 
  
Figure 4. Number of introductions of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses into Kenya depending on how many random sequences 
from Kenya were used to infer introductions. 
3.4. Estimating Population Dynamics of A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Kenya from the Local 
Transmission Clusters 
We estimated the effective reproduction number to be between 1 and 1.5 throughout 
the study period when we quantified the amount of local transmission on the basis of local 
transmission clusters (Figure 5A). We inferred seasonal fluctuations in Re between 2009 
and 2018, with annual peaks in Re usually occurring at the end of the year and annual 
drops in Re following the annual peaks, with the estimated median often being below 1 
(Figure 5A). The low Re values throughout 2009–2018 are consistent with the occurrence 
of smaller epidemics in Kenya throughout the study period. Coalescent reconstruction of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus occurrence in Kenya revealed (i) seasonal fluctuations in relative 
genetic diversity after an initial rapid increase during the early pandemic phase, which 
broadly corresponded to epidemic peaks in the northern and southern hemispheres, (ii) 
higher genetic diversity (genetic diversity > 10), with greater frequency of seasonal fluc-
tuations observed during 2009–2011 and 2018, and (iii) lower genetic diversity (variation 
occurring between 1 and 10 in genetic diversity), with relatively weaker seasonal fluctua-
tions sustained from 2012–2017 (Figure 5B). 





Figure 5. Population dynamics of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus from Kenya, 2009–2018. (A) Esti-
mates of the effective reproduction number through time inferred from all local clusters jointly by 
using BDSKY analysis. The primary y-axis shows the number of sequenced samples, while the sec-
ondary y-axis shows the effective reproduction number (Re). The dark pink section of the Re values 
is the mean Re estimate, whereas the light-pink margins denote the 95% confidence interval; time in 
years is shown on the x-axis. (B) Estimates of the relative genetic diversity through time for influ-
enza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus from Kenya, 2009–2018, resolved using GMRF analysis. The dark-blue 
line is the mean estimate, and the blue margin denotes the 95% interval. The relative genetic diver-
sity is shown on the y-axis, while time is shown on the x-axis. BDSKY, birth–death skyline; GMRF, 
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3.5. Regional Spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 Virus in Kenya 
To infer the patterns of spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus among three geographical 
regions of Kenya (central Kenya, western Kenya, and coastal Kenya), we summarized and 
visualized its geographic spread over time on the basis of significant rates of spread be-
tween the geographical regions. We observed significant rates of spread from western 
Kenya to central and coastal Kenya. Additionally, we observed supported rates of spread 
from coastal Kenya to western and central Kenya (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Networks of spread of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus reconstructed using sequence data 
from Kenya, 2009–2018. Asymmetric pathways of spread between geographical regions of Kenya 
(central Kenya, western Kenya, and coastal Kenya) were inferred. Colored arrows indicate signifi-
cant routes of spread from one location state to another, while line thickness represents the degree 
of statistical support. Red arrows are shown to indicate decisive routes of spread with Bayes factor 
(BF) support ≥1000; green lines represent very strongly supported routes with 100 ≤ BF < 1000; blue 
lines indicate strongly supported routes 10 ≤ BF < 100; purple dotted lines indicate supported routes 
with 3 ≤ BF < 10. 
4. Discussion 
We observed multiple A(H1N1)pdm09 virus introductions into Kenya over the study 
period, although only a few of those introductions instigated local seasonal epidemics that 
then established local transmission clusters, some of which persisted over several epi-
demic seasons across Kenya. Furthermore, we show that the seasonal epidemics were as-
sociated with a lower number of infections (low estimates of Re), consistent with estimates 
from other regions for A(H1N1)pdm09 virus during seasonal epidemics [51], as well as 
with seasonal fluctuations in virus genetic diversity. Additionally, the spread of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Kenya was characterized by countrywide transmission follow-
ing virus introduction. 
Genomic analysis of virus sequence data from Kenya during the pandemic in 2009 
reported the introduction of clade 2 and clade 7 viruses in Kenya, although clade 2 viruses 
did not circulate beyond the introductory foci, while clade 7 viruses disseminated coun-
trywide [52]. Here, through detailed genomic analysis, we extend these earlier observa-
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pandemic, disseminated countrywide, and persisted across multiple epidemics in multi-
ple locations as local transmission clusters. A key question in influenza virus evolution 
and epidemiology is whether viral lineages can persist at low levels of circulation on local 
and regional scales or whether new virus strains must be continually reseeded from a 
globally sustained gene pool [24]. The intensive sampling of viruses during the pandemic 
in 2009–2010 enabled the molecular epidemiology of IAV to be examined at such a high 
resolution that the introduction, persistence, and/or fade-out of individual transmission 
clusters in specific localities could be determined [5,22]. Our analysis revealed sustained 
persistence of seven A(H1N1)pdm09 virus transmission clusters for over 2 years, although 
increased sampling is required to confirm that isolates from other localities are not inter-
spersed within these clusters. 
Nonmolecular epidemiological studies have hinted at climate-driven patterns of in-
fluenza virus spread in Africa, for example, in Kenya [53] and Uganda [54], where climatic 
factors have been shown to influence the seasonality of influenza viruses. Therefore, per-
sistence in such African countries might be facilitated by climatic variability, which can 
generate temporally overlapping epidemics in neighboring regions [24]. Such patterns 
have been associated with global migration and persistence of influenza viruses in East 
and Southeast Asia [19]. Our findings support a shifting metapopulation model of circu-
lation of influenza viruses in which viruses may pass through any geographical region for 
a variable amount of time rather than perpetually circulate in fixed locations, whereby 
new virus strains can emerge in any geographical region, with the location of the source 
population changing regularly [19]. Wider and deeper sampling of viruses from under-
studied tropical and subtropical regions is, therefore, required for a more complete un-
derstanding of the regional and the global spread of influenza viruses.  
Inclusion of regional and global genome sequences deposited in GISAID significantly 
improved the power of our phylogenomic analyses, which showed that the Kenyan di-
versity was part of the global continuum. For example, we showed widespread mixing of 
Kenyan lineages with global viruses from Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, South 
America, and Oceania. The use of NGS technology to generate virus sequence data from 
Kenya enables further scrutiny of the available data to answer other key molecular epide-
miological questions. For example, the sequencing depth achieved with NGS may allow 
for analysis of minority variant populations. Therefore, NGS may facilitate more focused 
selection of vaccine strains based on strains in circulation in specific regions, which may 
improve the effectiveness of vaccines. 
The study had some limitations. Firstly, the samples analyzed in this study were col-
lected from hospitalized patients with SARI (CDC-Kenya) or viral pneumonia (KCH). 
This strategy avoided NGS of samples from outpatient cases that may have been critical 
in reconstructing the patterns of introduction and spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in 
Kenya. Secondly, the analysis in this report only involved the coding regions of the 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus gene segments. Although noncoding regions are considered to be 
conserved, mutations that affect viral replication may occur, and this information may not 
have been captured in this study. Thirdly, the paucity of sequence data from other African 
countries limited the analysis of regional patterns of persistence of influenza viruses, since 
persistence may be facilitated by climatic variability that generates temporally overlap-
ping epidemics in neighboring countries. Lastly, the prioritized samples were selected on 
the basis of anticipated probability of successful sequencing inferred from the sample’s 
viral load as indicated by the diagnosis Ct value. Such a strategy ultimately avoided NGS 
of some samples that may have been critical in reconstructing the patterns of spread of 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus and persistence of transmission clusters. 
In conclusion, although the intensity of influenza surveillance in Africa still lags be-
hind that of other continents, our findings suggest that considerable influenza virus di-
versity circulates within the continent, including virus lineages that are unique to the re-
gion, as reported for Kenya; these lineages may be capable of dissemination to other con-
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tinents through a globally migrating virus population. Further knowledge of the viral lin-
eages that circulate within understudied tropical and subtropical regions is required to 
understand the full diversity and global ecology of influenza viruses in humans and to 
inform vaccination strategies within these regions. 
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at www.mdpi.com/arti-
cle/10.3390/v13101956/s1: Figure S1. Map of Kenya showing the influenza sentinel surveillance sites 
for SARI used in this study. SARI, Severe Acute Respiratory Illness; GTRH, General Teaching and 
Referral Hospital; CH, County Hospital; CRH, County and Referral Hospital; NH, National Hospi-
tal, Figure S2. Sample processing flow for CDC-Kenya and KCH surveillance of IAV positive spec-
imens, 2009-2018. Next generation sequencing generated 344 and 39 codon complete 
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus sequences from the CDC-Kenya and KCH surveillance studies, respectively, 
which were used for this analysis. CDC, Centers for Disease Control; KCH, Kilifi County Hospital; 
IAV, influenza A virus. 
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